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Available online xxxxWe study the effects of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency using a unique dataset of private ﬁrms
from 14 Central and Eastern European countries from 2000 to 2013. We ﬁnd that an environ-
ment characterized by a high level of corruption has an adverse effect on ﬁrm efﬁciency. This
effect is stronger for ﬁrms with a lower propensity to behave corruptly, such as foreign-con-
trolled ﬁrms and ﬁrms managed by female CEOs, while local ﬁrms and ﬁrms with male CEOs
are not disadvantaged. We also ﬁnd that an environment characterized by considerable hetero-
geneity in the perception of corruption is associated with an increase in ﬁrm efﬁciency. This ef-
fect is particularly strong for foreign-controlled ﬁrms from low corruption countries, while no
effect is observed for ﬁrms managed by a female CEO.
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Europe1. Introduction
Corruption imposes signiﬁcant costs to many countries (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). A major cost is that by
rewarding ﬁrms willing to engage in such activities, corruption allows inefﬁcient ﬁrms to survive, reduces the rewards that efﬁ-
cient ﬁrms can obtain, and more generally attenuates the competitive pressures leading to efﬁciency. In this paper we examine
how corruption affects efﬁciency at the ﬁrm level. Since engaging in corruption typically requires the participation, or at least15927S. The usual disclaimer applies.
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2 J. Hanousek et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthe tacit consent of owners and top managers, especially in private ﬁrms, we also examine the role of these key stakeholders
when operating in corrupt environments.
We argue that (i) ﬁrms operating in an environment perceived to be more corrupt will be less efﬁcient than those operating in
one which is perceived as less corrupt, but that (ii) heterogeneity in the perceptions of corruption may have a positive effect on
ﬁrm efﬁciency. This effect may arise because differences in perceptions of corruption may signal the presence of different “sub-
environments”. Even in an environment that is very corrupt on average, there may be sectors and geographical zones where
ﬁrms with a lower propensity to bribe can still operate relatively freely. In these sub-environments, competitive forces may op-
erate to full effect and ﬁrm efﬁciency may be high. Thus, greater heterogeneity in perceptions of corruption may be associated, on
average, with more efﬁciency.
We expect the intensity of these two (mean and variance) effects to be stronger for ﬁrms with a lower propensity to corrup-
tion. These “honest” ﬁrms are the ones most likely to be adversely affected when doing business requires engagement in corrupt
activities. However, if they can choose to operate in areas of the economy where bribes are less common, their incentives to raise
efﬁciency may still be high.
We examine a number of ﬁrm attributes that are likely to be associated with a lower propensity to bribe. For private ﬁrms,
corporate decisions and, in particular, the decision whether or not to bribe are most likely determined by two groups of stake-
holders: owners and managers. Accordingly, we examine how characteristics of owners and managers affect the efﬁciency-corrup-
tion relationship. An extensive literature in international business argues that foreign-controlled ﬁrms plausibly exhibit a lower
propensity to bribe, in part because they are less likely to know whom and how to bribe in the local market (Calhoun, 2002).
The lower propensity to bribe may be particularly pronounced for foreign-controlled ﬁrms from low-corruption countries, as
their behavior is affected by their cultural and legal imprint (Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Foreign ﬁrms
also tend to follow responsible business practices and care about their reputation (D'Souza and Kaufmann, 2013). There is also
direct evidence that foreign ﬁrms exhibit a lower propensity to bribe (Kouznetsov and Dass, 2010; Gueorguiev and Malesky,
2012; D'Souza and Kaufmann, 2013).
Firms run by a female CEO may also be especially reluctant to engage in criminal activities such as bribery (Dollar et al., 2001;
Swamy et al., 2001). This could be due to factors such as higher risk-aversion (Bertrand, 2011; Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Faccio
et al., 2016), less overconﬁdence (Deaux and Farris, 1977; Lundeberg et al., 1994; Barber and Odean, 2001), or more pro-social
attitudes than men (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Funk and Gathmann, 2011).
We test our hypotheses using a unique panel dataset that combines information on business environment characteristics (and
corruption in particular) from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) with ﬁ-
nancial, ownership, and managerial information available in the Amadeus database maintained by Bureau van Dijk. Our ﬁnal
dataset contains 76,552 ﬁrm-level observations and covers 14 countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine) from 2000 to 2013. To our knowl-
edge, it is among the largest and most comprehensive ﬁrm-level datasets to study the effects of corruption.
We ﬁnd strong support for most of our hypotheses. Firm efﬁciency is on average lower in environments characterized by a
high level of corruption. A 1% increase in the average level of corruption is associated with a 2.04% decrease in average ﬁrm ef-
ﬁciency. However, greater variance in corruption perceptions is associated with greater efﬁciency. A 1% increase in corruption per-
ception variation improves ﬁrm efﬁciency by 0.61%. This suggests that ﬁrms with a lower propensity to bribe, and for which,
therefore, a low corruption environment is particularly important, are able to locate in sub-environments where corruption is
less prevalent. The effects are stronger for foreign-controlled ﬁrms, especially if their headquarters are located in low-corruption
countries. For example, while a 1% increase in the average level of corruption leads to a 3.16% decrease in efﬁciency of foreign
ﬁrms, this effect jumps to 4.53% for foreign-controlled ﬁrms from countries with low levels of corruption. Having a female CEO
is detrimental to efﬁciency in high-corruption environments; however, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect for the variance in cor-
ruption perceptions.1
This paper makes several contributions to the corporate ﬁnance literature. First, most papers analyzing the effects of corruption
on ﬁrm performance focus on accounting performance measures (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Mironov, 2015). In contrast,
we look at the effect of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency, deﬁned as the ability of a ﬁrm to produce the most output with a given
amount of inputs. This is important because theory suggests that fair competition will lead to higher efﬁciency (Leibenstein,
1966; Nickell, 1996). In addition, it might be more important, or easier, for ﬁrms to manipulate ﬁnancial ﬁgures (Demsetz,
1997; Schulze et al., 2001) than input-output ﬁgures.2 Thus, there may be a more direct and observable relationship between cor-
ruption and ﬁrm efﬁciency than between corruption and ﬁrm performance.
Second, we demonstrate that different characteristics of a corrupt environment have different implications for ﬁrm efﬁciency. Specif-
ically, we show that simply examiningmeasures such as the average level of corruption, without considering dispersion across sectors or
regions,may bemisleading. Our evidence is consistentwith the idea that ﬁrms self-select into the areas of the economywhere theywant
to operate, and that more “honest” ﬁrms choose to operate in sub-environments characterized by less corruption.1 Interestingly,we donot observe any differences in efﬁciency between ﬁrmsmanagedbymale and female CEOs.Weonly observe a differencewhenwe condition on
the local corruption environment. This is consistent with the argument that women are not, on average, different from men in terms of ability, but they differ in their
preferences for risk and propensity to abide by the law.
2 For example, the standard proﬁt-basedmeasures could be biased. First,ﬁrmswith higher current or expectedproﬁtsmay not only have a higher probability to bribe,
but would also pay larger amounts (Svensson, 2003). Second, ﬁrms with low proﬁts may start bribing in order to survive and/or grow. Third, bribing ﬁrms can also use
bribes to pay lower taxes, extract and/or hide proﬁt. For a comprehensive overview of ﬁrm bribery motives we refer to Svensson (2005).
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environments. Previous work on corruption examines the performance implications when managers have different propensities to
engage in corrupt activities. These papers generally focus on a single country or region, and hence implicitly take characteristics of
the environment as given. For instance, Mironov (2015) focuses on ﬁrms in a highly corrupt environment (Russia), while Amore
and Bennedsen (2013) focus on ﬁrms in a low corruption environment (Denmark). In contrast, we examine how the effect of key
stakeholders with a different propensity to engage in corrupt activities changes as characteristics of the corrupt environment
change. Foreign-owned ﬁrms and ﬁrms run by female CEOs may be at a particular disadvantage in highly corrupt environments,
though these adverse effects may be reduced if there is a larger dispersion in the level of corruption across sectors or regions.
Therefore, our study contributes to a better understanding of how ownership structure and CEO characteristics affect ﬁrm perfor-
mance in corrupt environments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 outlines the
modeling strategy and Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.2. Hypotheses development
Conventional wisdom suggests that corruption reduces efﬁciency by giving an unfair advantage to ﬁrms which have a higher
propensity to behave corruptly and are connected to ofﬁcials willing to accept bribes. Studies focusing on the macroeconomic ef-
fects of corruption have found that it has an adverse effect on investment (Mauro, 1995), foreign direct investment, and capital
inﬂows (Wei, 2000). It has also been shown to reduce country-level productivity and economic growth (e.g., Mauro, 1995,
1998; Mo, 2001). At the micro level, corruption can also have an adverse effect on ﬁrm efﬁciency as it distorts the efﬁcient allo-
cation of capital (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Bertrand et al., 2007; Harstad and Svensson, 2011).
There are very few empirical studies at the ﬁrm level that examine the effects of corruption on performance. This is most
likely due to the illicit nature of the activity and associated difﬁculties in collecting data. d Studies mainly focus on a particular
country and there are very few cross-country analyses. For example, using a sample of 243 Ugandan ﬁrms, Svensson (2003)
ﬁnds that the number of corrupt payments is conversely related to the tangibility of assets, because ﬁrms adopt inefﬁcient
“ﬂy-by-night” production technologies to counter corruption pressures. Further exploring the Ugandan data, Fisman and
Svensson (2007) report that both the rate of taxation and bribery rate are negatively related to ﬁrm growth. In a cross-country
analysis, Bardhan (1997) argues that the inherent uncertainty of illegal agreements creates the wrong incentives for ﬁrms. A
ﬁrm will choose to invest in less productive general capital, and not in the more productive speciﬁc capital, because the former
can easily be relocated (Henisz, 2000). Thus, corruption would affect the quality of investment, causing a decrease in
efﬁciency.
Challenging this conventional wisdom, some scholars argue that corruption may be conducive to greater efﬁciency. Leff
(1964), among others, argues that it enables individuals or ﬁrms to work around misguided government policies, rigid laws, bu-
reaucratic bottlenecks, and red tape (See also Lui, 1985; Méon and Weill, 2010). Empirical evidence which supports this positive
effect is mainly limited to certain regions in Asia. Rock and Bonnett (2004) report a signiﬁcant positive relationship between eco-
nomic growth and corruption in China and Indonesia. Vial and Hanoteau (2010) focus on the Indonesian manufacturing industry
from 1975 to 1995 and ﬁnd that plant-level corruption increases output and productivity. The authors argue that the positive ef-
fect arises from the long-term relationship between government and ﬁrms, which facilitates the latter's ability to overcome red
tape and barriers to doing business. However, Asia, and speciﬁcally Southeast Asia, is a singular region, where f economies are
based on relationships, contracts are not well-enforced and capital is scarce (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
In formulating hypothesis 1, we follow the conventional view of the effects of corruption on ﬁrm performance.
H1. Corruption has an adverse impact on ﬁrm efﬁciency.
Heterogeneity in perceptions of corruption within a given environment could be caused by ﬁrms having different experiences
with ofﬁcials. There are, in principle, two possible effects that this heterogeneity in experiences may have on efﬁciency. First,
greater uncertainty over whom to bribe and how much to pay would likely increase uncertainty and may reduce investment
(Wei, 1997; Bloom, 2009). Thus, greater variance in perceptions of corruption may be associated, on average, with lower
efﬁciency.
Alternatively, signiﬁcant heterogeneity in perceptions of corruption may indicate the existence of sub-environments that are
characterized by different degrees of corruption. For example, Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that corruption in contracting occurs
even in low-corruption countries. Similarly, Transparency International's 2002 Bribe Payers' Index names the public works/con-
struction sector to be the most vulnerable to corruption in emerging economies worldwide. Corruption may also be more or
less pronounced in different parts of the same country; for instance, it is considerably higher in Southern Italy than in Northern
Italy (Golden and Picci, 2006). Thus, some sub-environments (certain industries, geographical areas) could be relatively corrup-
tion-free even in the most corrupt environments. As ﬁrms in these low-corruption sub-environments would be forced to compete
with each other relatively fairly, higher heterogeneity in perceptions of corruption may be associated, on average, with higher
efﬁciency.
To summarize, the effect of heterogeneity in perceptions of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency is a priori ambiguous. Given that cor-
ruption does seem to be concentrated in speciﬁc sub-environments (e.g., construction) and ﬁrms can choose in which sectors they
operate, we tentatively put forward the following:Please cite this article as: Hanousek, J., et al., Firm efﬁciency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments, J. Corp.
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The effects of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency are likely to be more pronounced for ﬁrms with a lower propensity to bribe. These
ﬁrms are the most likely to be adversely affected when corruption is high. They may lose contracts to bribing ﬁrms, possibly
resulting in capital and labor being severely under-utilized. On the other hand, they should be the ﬁrst to move their operations
to less corrupt sub-environments (e.g., from the South to the North of Italy), thus beneﬁtting the most in terms of efﬁciency from
regional or sectoral differences in corruption.
A key empirical challenge is how to identify ﬁrms with a lower propensity to bribe. Owners and managers are the stakeholders
most likely to set the ﬁrm's strategic direction. We investigate how the characteristics of these key stakeholders moderate the re-
lationship between the corrupt environment and ﬁrm efﬁciency. We examine two observable key stakeholder characteristics that
could be associated with a lower propensity to bribe: foreign ownership, especially if the headquarters of the ﬁrm is based in a
low-corruption country, and female CEO.3,4
While foreign ﬁrms can certainly be involved in corruption, we expect foreign-controlled ﬁrms to have, on average, a lower
propensity to behave corruptly for several reasons. First, cultural norms are an important determinant of corruption. For example,
Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the social behavior of diplomatic leaders abroad is highly correlated with their home-coun-
try-speciﬁc corruption scores. We therefore expect foreign ﬁrms from low corruption countries to have a lower propensity to
bribe. Second, foreign ﬁrms could be the subject of strict anti-bribery regulation in their home country.5 For instance, Cuervo-
Cazurra (2006, 2008) demonstrates that implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention made investors from countries
that adopted the Convention, and even investors from the US already bound by the FCPA, less likely to invest in corrupt countries.
Third, foreign ﬁrms are also more concerned about their reputation and tend to follow more responsible business practices. In
fact, many voluntary codes of corporate conduct contain anti-bribery provisions. Multinational ﬁrms, even when their headquar-
ters are based in high-corruption countries, often have such codes and enforce them. Fourth, lack of knowledge of the local en-
vironment may prevent foreign ﬁrms from getting involved in corruption (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997;
Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007; Bell et al., 2012). Fifth, existing empirical evidence suggests that foreign ﬁrms have a lower propensity
to bribe (Kouznetsov and Dass, 2010; Gueorguiev and Malesky, 2012; D'Souza and Kaufmann, 2013). For example, D'Souza and
Kaufmann (2013) conduct a large cross-country study analyzing procurement bribery data from 11,000 enterprises in 125 coun-
tries. They ﬁnd that smaller domestic ﬁrms are more likely to bribe than larger and foreign-owned ﬁrms. To the extent that the
propensity not to bribe can be proxied by foreign ownership, especially for ﬁrms whose headquarters are based in low-corruption
countries, we suggest that mean and variance effects (H1 and H2) are mediated as follows:
H3. The adverse impact of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency is particularly strong for ﬁrms controlled by foreign owners. The effect is
strongest for owners whose headquarters are based in low-corruption countries.
H4. Heterogeneity in corruption perception has a particularly strong positive effect on efﬁciency of ﬁrms controlled by foreign
owners. The effect is strongest for owners whose headquarters are based in low-corruption countries.
We also expect female CEOs to be, on average, less predisposed toward corruption and less likely to get involved in it (Dollar
et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). For example, Goetz (2007) suggests that greater female participation in government is associated
with lower corruption and is driven by the relative exclusion of women from networks traditionally dominated by men. Women
are also found to be less likely to be asked for a bribe (Mocan, 2008). They are more reciprocal in the context of gift-exchanges
(Croson and Buchan, 1999; Buchan et al., 2008) and less likely to lie when it is costly to the other side (Erat and Gneezy, 2012).
Further, as bribery may be detected and participants punished, women may be less willing to participate in such activities
(Levin et al., 1988; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996). This could be due to different attitudes toward risk between women and
men. A large experimental literature that compares how men and women value risky gambles or choose between gambles, doc-
uments systematic differences in risk preferences, with women being more risk-averse than men (see Croson and Gneezy (2009)
and Eckel and Grossman (2008) for an extensive review of this literature). Higher risk-aversion of women is also reﬂected in ﬁ-
nancial decisions (Barber and Odean, 2001; Sapienza et al., 2009; Neelakantan, 2010), decisions made by ﬁnancial professionals
(Dwyer et al., 2002; Beckmann and Menkhoff, 2008) and even by top executives (Bandiera et al., 2015; Belenzon et al., 2016;
Faccio et al., 2016). Higher risk-aversion of women is often explained by their relatively lower overconﬁdence (Lundeberg et
al., 1994; Barber and Odean, 2001). This lower overconﬁdence has also been documented for female top executives, who are dem-
onstrated to be less likely to engage in acquisitions and to issue debt than their male counterparts (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Lack
of overconﬁdence may also imply that women's perceived likelihood of being caught is higher and hence their propensity to bribe
is lower.3 While it might be preferable to directly estimate the propensity to bribe for each ﬁrm using information available in BEEPS, in practice one could face a number of
problems. First, missing accounting information could lead to biased inference from the data analysis, as the worst-performing ﬁrms have an incentive not to report
theirﬁnancial information, but to complain themost about corruption (Jensen et al., 2010). Second, using BEEPS alone does not allow us to properly address such issues
as endogeneity, unobservedﬁrm level heterogeneity and selection bias because the dataset lacks panel structure.We therefore identify theﬁrmswith lower propensity
to bribe exogenously, instead of estimating ﬁrm propensity to bribe based on its characteristics.
4 Firmsmanagedby a foreign CEO could also exhibit a lower propensity to bribe. Data limitations prevent us from testing this conjecture (even though themanagerial
information is available for 38% of ﬁrms in the sample, b1% of them are managed by a foreign CEO).
5 E.g., the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UK Bribery Act and OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials in International Business
Transactions.
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ical behavior in the workplace (Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Lund, 2008). They may also be more likely to behave honestly to teach
their children appropriate values (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).
Since female CEOs are likely to have a lower propensity to bribe, we suggest that the mean and variance effects (H1 and H2)
are mediated as follows:
H5. Firms that operate in more corrupt environments are less efﬁcient, especially when a ﬁrm has a female CEO.
H6. Heterogeneity in corruption perception is positively related to efﬁciency, especially when a ﬁrm has a female CEO.3. Data
We obtain data on corruption and other business environment characteristics from the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank
Group (the World Bank). BEEPS is a ﬁrm-level anonymous survey of a representative sample of private ﬁrms that aims to gain an
understanding of their perception of their operating environment. It covers a broad range of business environment topics includ-
ing access to ﬁnance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and performance measures. We use four waves of the survey,
completed in 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2013.6
In particular, BEEPS contains the corruption experiences of ﬁrm managers and is the most detailed data on corruption available
at the ﬁrm level (Svensson, 2005). The corruption measure provided by BEEPS is superior to the country-level proxy indicators of
corruption, as it reﬂects the variation and extent of corruption across industry, time, ﬁrm size and urban location, while country-
level proxy indicators of corruption (e.g., Transparency International Corruption Perception Index) generally exhibit very little var-
iation over time.7 At the same time, a signiﬁcant disadvantage of BEEPS data is the missing accounting information for a large
number of ﬁrms, which could lead to biased inference from the data analysis, as the worst-performing ﬁrms have an incentive
not to report their ﬁnancial information, but to complain the most about corruption (Jensen et al., 2010). For example, about
40% of BEEPS ﬁrms have missing information on sales and assets.8 To overcome the problem of missing accounting data we
match BEEPS to the Amadeus database maintained by Bureau van Dijk, that contains comprehensive ﬁnancial information on pri-
vate companies across Europe. We focus on 14 countries in Central and Eastern Europe from 2000 to 2013.9 The annual panel is
constructed by combining multiple updates of the Amadeus database. This strategy helps to eliminate survivor bias because a ﬁrm
that stops providing ﬁnancial statements is removed from the database after four years. Therefore, using several snapshots of the
database allows us to add back observations for ﬁrms that are not present in more recent updates. Moreover, as every update
contains a snapshot of the currently active population of ﬁrms and up to the 10 most recent years of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial data, our
approach allows us to extend ﬁrms' historical ﬁnancial data beyond the most recent decade.
The ﬁnancial data are further combined with the ownership data obtained from Amadeus. It is important to highlight that each
edition of the Amadeus database covers only the current ownership structure. Again, we use several snapshots of the database to
reconstruct end-of-year ownership structures for the period under research. Finally, we add managerial data that became avail-
able with the latest Amadeus update. The data contain information on the manager's name, position, gender, nationality, and ten-
ure. In particular, using the appointment dates we are able to match managers to speciﬁc ﬁrm-ﬁnancial years.
Most ﬁrms in Amadeus report unconsolidated ﬁnancial statements; consolidated statements are provided when available. In
our dataset, we use unconsolidated ﬁnancial statements to avoid double-counting ﬁrms and subsidiaries or operations abroad
and exclude ﬁrms that only report consolidated statements. We also exclude the ﬁnancial intermediation sector and insurance in-
dustries (NACE codes 64–66) since they have a different balance sheet and a speciﬁc liability structure.
3.1. Sample construction
Combining BEEPS and Amadeus data provides us with a unique ﬁrm-level dataset that contains proxies for business environ-
ment conditions and corruption perception at the ﬁrm level. To merge BEEPS data with the Amadeus database we ﬁrst form mini-
environments or clusters of ﬁrms in BEEPS based on their country, industry, size, size of the urban area in which they are regis-
tered, and the corresponding time period, to match BEEPS waves.10 Then, by extracting responses to the statement “It is common
for ﬁrms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments or gifts’ to get things done with regard to cus-
toms, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc.” and normalizing them to between 0 (never) and 1 (always), we construct6 Detailed survey information is available at http://ebrd-beeps.com/about/.
7 The variation in the country-level proxy indicators of corruption in themajority of cases could be captured by country-, region- or industry-speciﬁc effects,making it
difﬁcult to single out the corruption effect.
8 While the issue ofmisreporting or not reporting at all is inherent in surveydata,measurement errors are aminor concern in cross-country studies, provided they are
not systematically related to the country characteristics (Svensson, 2005).
9 These countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
Ukraine.
10 In particular, the clusters are constructed using country, industry (2-digit ISIC rev 3.1), ﬁrm size (micro ﬁrms with 2–10 employees, small ﬁrms with 11–49 em-
ployees, medium and large ﬁrmswith N50 employees), size of the urban area inwhich they are registered (capital, city with a population above 1million, and city with
a population below 1 million) and the corresponding time period (2000–2002, 2003–2005, 2006–2009, and 2010–2013).
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sion in the perception of the corruption level (corruption standard deviation) in each cluster. We further extract other character-
istics of the business environment from BEEPS, including access to ﬁnancing, tax rates, customs and trade regulations, business
licensing and permits, labor regulation and the functioning of the judiciary environment. These variables are also normalized to
between 0 and 1. The total number of BEEPS observations with non-missing data on corruption for the countries under scrutiny
is 22,260. Imposing the constraint of at least 4 observations per cluster further reduces the number of observations to 15,975, with
a total of 1529 clusters. Finally, these BEEPS clusters are populated with ﬁrms from the Amadeus database that are operating in
the same cluster.11
As the BEEPS business environment measures and ﬁrm efﬁciency measure are constant over three-year periods, we also aver-
age the ﬁnancial information from Amadeus over three years. This allows a reduction in the measurement error as well as the
inﬂuence of any potential accounting adjustments. Details on the construction of the ﬁrm-level variables are provided in the
Firm Efﬁciency Determinants section (Section 4.2) along with the sample descriptive statistics.
4. Modeling strategy
To study the effect of a corrupt environment on a ﬁrm's efﬁciency we employ a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). First, we de-
rive a ﬁrm's efﬁciency from the stochastic production possibility frontier and then relate the estimated ﬁrm efﬁciency to ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc characteristics, the ﬁrm's ownership and managerial structure, and the operating environment.
4.1. Firm efﬁciency – stochastic frontier analysis
Firm efﬁciency is estimated using the stochastic production frontier model. This approach compares companies to the most
efﬁcient company (i.e. the one with the “best practices”) rather than the average company (e.g., an OLS regression).12 First, we
deﬁne the production function as:11 This
not bep
Hanous
12 See
(2005)
13 Sinc
14 The
Pleas
Finanyit ¼ f xit;βð Þ  TEit : ð1ÞThe ﬁrst part of the equation relates the output yt and the inputs xt through a production function yt= f(xt;β). Technical efﬁ-
ciency TEi takes into account the efﬁciency of the use of the input variables. In other words, if TEi = 1 then a company uses its
inputs efﬁciently and thus achieves its maximum feasible outcome, while TEi b 1 denotes some kind of inefﬁciency. Since the out-
put is always positive, TEi is therefore deﬁned on the interval between (0,1]. Stochastic frontier analysis then makes two assump-
tions. Technical efﬁciencies, TEi, is a stochastic variable that has a distribution which is common to all ﬁrms. We therefore denote
it as TEi = exp(−uit).13 The error term is denoted as exp.(vit) to account for random shocks in production (e.g. machinery break-
down). The stochastic production function model is then rewritten asyt ¼ f xt ;βð Þ∙ exp −uitð Þ∙ exp vitð Þ ð2Þand its logarithm form isln yit ¼ β0 þ∑
k
j¼1
βjit ln xit þ vit−uit; ð3Þ
where vit is a two-sided normally distributed error term and uit is the technical inefﬁciency variable. It is non-negative and
measures the distance from the efﬁciency frontier.Technical efﬁciency is modeled using the Cobb-Douglas production function where its parameters are interacted with 2-digit
NACE industry dummy variables to account for industry idiosyncrasies.14 We specify the model of the efﬁciency frontier of I ﬁrms
(i = 1, …,I) in J two-digit NACE sectors (j = 1, …,J) over T time periods (t = 1, …,T) as:ln yit ¼ ∑
j¼1;…; J
β0 j þ β1 j ln cit þ β2 j ln lit
h i
∙IDitj þ ϕt þ vit−uit : ð4ÞThe corporate output variable yit is sales (i.e. the turnover variable in the Amadeus database). lncit is the log of the capital of
each ﬁrm i. Capital is proxied by total ﬁxed assets plus working capital, which is deﬁned as current assets minus currentapproach helps us to deal laterwith potential endogeneity between corruption and efﬁciency, unobserved ﬁrm level heterogeneity and selection bias that can-
roperly addressedwhenusing BEEPS alone, as thedataset does not have a panel structure. A similar approach has been usedbyCommander and Svejnar (2011),
ek and Kochanova (2016), and Fungáčová et al. (2015).
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) for stochastic frontier analysis and Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Kumbhakar (1990), and Greene
for panel data application to stochastic frontier analysis. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide a detailed literature survey.
e technical efﬁciency TEi is deﬁned in the interval, uit is non-negative.
Cobb-Douglas function is a standard and less restrictive production function. Recently, for example, Chirinko et al. (2011) argue for its robust functionality.
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7J. Hanousek et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxxliabilities.15 lnlit is deﬁned as the logarithm of the number of employees. Fundamentally, capital and labor represent inputs into
production to generate output sales. IDijt stands for a vector of industry (j) dummy variables. All parameters of the production
function in model (4) — the constant term and both production inputs (capital and labor) — are interacted with 2-digit NACE in-
dustry dummy variables to beneﬁt from a ﬂexible functional form. vit is the random error and uit represents the efﬁciency of the
ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm is fully efﬁcient then uit = 0. Any inefﬁciency is represented through a non-negative uit. The inefﬁciency compo-
nent of the model (uit) is not directly observable and has to be calculated according to classical assumptions where15 Add
cause it
any abu
16 The
shocks a
We also
unlikely
has bee
in the e
Pleas
Finanνit∼iid N 0;σ
2
ν
 
and ui  iid Nþ 0;σ2u
 
:The minimum squared error predictor of the technical efﬁciency of the ith ﬁrm is then calculated asE exp −uitf gjεið Þ ¼ E exp β tð Þ  uif gjεið Þ ¼
1−Φ σi− μ

i =σ

ið Þ½ 
1−Φ −μi =σ

i
   exp −μi þ 12σ
2
i
 
;where εit=νit−uit, μi ¼ μσ
2
ν−Tεiσ
2
σ2νþTσ2
and σ 2i ¼ σ
2
νσ
2
σ2νþTσ2
:
Since u is identiﬁed by the minimum squared error predictor, v is the remaining difference (ε − u). Battese and Coelli (1992),
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Greene (2008) provide excellent sources for the details.
Model (4) is estimated in a series of short panels (2000–2002, 2003–2005, 2006–2009, and 2010–2013) to account for time-
varying changes in technical efﬁciencies. As demonstrated by Greene (2005), the short time periods over which the technical ef-
ﬁciency is estimated attenuate any potential bias of the estimated parameters in a ﬁxed-effect stochastic frontier model and also
allow a feasible estimation.16 The estimation is performed country-by-country to account for the different efﬁciency levels of each
industry between countries. From an econometrics standpoint, this is a preferred method because it is less restrictive than esti-
mating the model with country dummies. Additionally, it is much more operational to estimate. Finally, we also include year
dummy variables to account for time-speciﬁc effects, which in short panels allow us to capture industry-speciﬁc price variation.
4.2. Firm efﬁciency determinants
We further model a ﬁrm's efﬁciency as a function of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and business environment characteristics, to analyze the dif-
ferences in efﬁciency from the “best practice” companies. Therefore, we use the distance from the efﬁciency frontier (estimated
from Eq. (4)) and analyze it as a function of several factors that inﬂuence the ﬁrm. We are particularly interested in the role of
corruption practices, ﬁrm ownership, and CEO characteristics in facilitating or hindering ﬁrm efﬁciency. The model is formalized
as follows.uit ¼ α0 þ βXit þ∑
2
k¼1
γBkCorruption
k
rk þ∑
L
l¼1
γEl BusEnvt
l
rt
þ ∑
M
m¼1
γδmOwnC
m
it þ λ1FemaleCEOit þ λ2MissingCEOit
þ τt þ η j þ φs þ θc þω f þ εit
ð5Þfor all i = 1, …, N (ﬁrm index); t = 1, …, T (time index); r = 1, …, R (cluster index), c = 1, …, C (country index); j = 1, …, J
(double digit industry index); s = 1, …, S (ﬁrm size index); f = 1, …, F (urban area size index); b = 1, …, B (corruption mea-
sures); e = 1, …, E (business environment characteristics); and m = 1, …, M (ownership categories).
The variables in (Eq. (5)) are deﬁned as follows. uit is the distance from the efﬁciency frontier for a ﬁrm i at time period t;
Corruption is represented by corruption mean and corruption standard deviation. Corruption mean represents the (mean) cost
all ﬁrms have to incur to conduct business or respond to corruption demand. Corruption standard deviation characterizes the dif-
ferences in the perception of the corruption level. The BusEnvt (Business Environment) vector contains business environment char-
acteristics, comprised of access to ﬁnancing, tax rates, customs and trade regulations, business licensing and permits, labor
regulation, and functioning of the judiciary. Both the Corruption and Business Environment variables come from BEEPS and are cal-
culated at the cluster level (see Section 3.1 for details).
Vector Xit contains a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics (size, proﬁtability, leverage, and cash balance) of ﬁrm i at time t. The
ownership structure (OwnCitm) is deﬁned for each ﬁrm i in year t. We differentiate between majority-controlled domestic and for-
eign ﬁrms, ﬁrms with minority non-controlling ownership, and with dispersed ownership. FemaleCEOit equals 1 if the CEO of theing working capital to total ﬁxed assets is a common efﬁciency measure for several reasons: i)Working capital management is closely related to efﬁciency be-
optimizes the allocation of short-term capital (Kim et al., 1998). ii) Working capital helps to manage the day-to-day operations of the company efﬁciently and
ndant cash holdings make companies targets for potential acquirers.
estimation performed on a series of short panels also takes care of the endogeneity concern that arises from the correlation between unobservable productivity
nd input levels (see Griliches and Mairesse, 1999 for a detailed discussion). This approach has the advantage of a feasible assumption of constant inefﬁciency.
expect that ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invariant heterogeneity would be taken care of by ﬁxed-effect estimation (for example, the size of the ﬁrm, or technology, are
to change rapidly). While estimation on short panels carries the advantage of limiting endogeneity concerns, it also carries a risk of a small time dimension. It
nmentioned by several authors that there is a potential bias resulting from a small T (number of periods). However, Greene (2005) demonstrates that the biases
stimated parameters in ﬁxed-effect stochastic frontier models are actually fairy moderate.
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8 J. Hanousek et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxxﬁrm i at time t is female. Due to incompleteness of managerial data we also control for cases when CEO gender information is
missing by including a MissingCEO dummy. Finally, we include country (θc), time period (τt), industry (ηj), ﬁrm size (φs), and
urban area size (ωf) ﬁxed effects that correspond to the BEEPS-Amadeus matching clusters.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics are constructed as follows. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as a ratio of operating proﬁt over total assets.
Industry-adjusted leverage is calculated as the ﬁrm's leverage minus its industry mean leverage, where leverage is deﬁned as the
ratio of short- and long-term liabilities over total assets. Cash is deﬁned as company cash holdings over total assets.
To control for the interference of ownership and CEO gender with the corrupt environment and to properly test hypotheses H3
and H5, we need to further extend model (5). In particular, we add the interactions of foreign-controlled ﬁrms (ForeignC) and a
female CEO dummy (FemaleCEO) with the corrupt environment characteristics into the model. The resulting speciﬁcation has the
following form:Table 1
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Finanuit ¼ α0 þ βXit þ∑
2
k¼1
γBkCorruption
k
rk þ∑
L
l¼1
γEl BusEnvt
l
rt
þ ∑
M
m¼1
δmOwnC
m
it þ λ1FemaleCEOit þ λ2MissingCEOit
þ υ1CorruptionMean  ForeignCit þ υ2CorruptionStDev  ForeignCit
þ μ1CorruptionMean  FemaleCEOit þ μ2CorruptionStDev  FemaleCEOit
þ τt þ η j þ φs þ θc þω f þ εit :
ð6ÞUsing models (5) and (6), the hypotheses (H1–H6) formulated in Section 2 can be tested as follows.
If corruption has an adverse impact on ﬁrm efﬁciency (H1), then the coefﬁcient on corruption mean (γ1B) will be positive. H2
states that heterogeneity in corruption perception is positively related to efﬁciency, and therefore the coefﬁcient on corruption
standard deviation (γ2B) is expected to be negative.ive statistics.
le Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
dent variable
ciency 76,552 0.699 0.171 0.0002 0.986
pt environment
ruption mean 76,697 0.234 0.141 0 0.8
ruption std. deviation 76,687 0.223 0.010 0 0.707
speciﬁc ﬁnancial variablesa
al assets ('000,000) 76,630 7.401 36.17 0.0004 966
[ln(total assets)] 76,630 −0.647 2.43 −10.21 6.88
ﬁtability 76,630 0.076 0.213 −1.287 1.113
ustry adjusted leverage 64,315 −0.0004 0.174 −0.272 0.974
h 76,630 0.104 0.150 0.0002 0.873
ematic factors for operation and growthb
ess to ﬁnancingc 76,697 0.390 0.160 0 1
rates 76,697 0.604 0.165 0 1
tom and trade regulations 76,634 0.206 0.161 0 0.875
iness licensing & permits 76,697 0.288 0.165 0 0.938
or regulations 76,697 0.268 0.162 0 0.833
ctioning of the judiciary 76,697 0.287 0.193 0 0.917
rship control+
eign 76,697 0.153 0.360 0 1
estic 76,697 0.230 0.421 0 1
ority - no control 76,697 0.009 0.092 0 1
gerial data
ale CEO 76,697 0.042 0.200 0 1
sing CEO 76,697 0.621 0.486 0 1
-speciﬁc variables are constructed as follows. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as a ratio of operating proﬁt over total assets. Industry adjusted leverage is calculated as
's leverage minus its industry mean average; leverage is deﬁned as a ratio of short- and long-term liabilities over total assets. Cash is deﬁned as company
ldings over total assets.
a cover 14 Central and Eastern European countries: Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
a, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
n the deﬁnitions of variables:
en from the BEEPS survey, from the question if it is common to make “additional” irregular payments to get things done (1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = -
es, 4 = frequently, 5 = usually, 6 = always). Transformation applied: (variable − 1) / 5.
en from the BEEPS survey, from the set of questions on the business environment (1 = no obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle, 3 = moderate obstacle, 4 = major
). Transformation applied: (factor − 1) / 3.
, collateral required orﬁnancing not available frombanks.+ Taken from theAMADEUSdatabase; the ownership status (dummyvariable) corresponds to the end
lendar year.
en from the AMADEUS database; the ownership status (dummy variable) corresponds to the end of the calendar year.
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reﬂected in positive coefﬁcients on the foreign-controlled dummy variable (δ1ForeignC) and on the interaction term between for-
eign-controlled ﬁrms and corruption mean (υ1). If the adverse effect of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency is stronger for foreign owners
whose headquarters are based in low-corruption countries, then the coefﬁcients on the foreign-controlled ﬁrms from low corrup-
tion countries will be larger than that on the foreign-controlled ﬁrms from the other countries (δ1ForeignC_LowCorruptionNδ1ForeignC_RestN0
and υ1ForeignC_LowCorruptionNυ1ForeignC_RestN0).
Similarly, the particularly strong positive effect of heterogeneity in corruption perception on ﬁrm efﬁciency for majority-con-
trolled foreign ﬁrms (H4), should be reﬂected in a negative coefﬁcient on the interaction term between foreign-controlled ﬁrms
and corruption standard deviation (υ2). If the positive effect of heterogeneity in corruption perception on ﬁrm efﬁciency is stron-
ger for owners whose headquarters are based in low-corruption countries, then the following holds:
υ2ForeignC_LowCorruptionbυ2ForeignC_Restb0.
Finally, the additional adverse effect of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency for ﬁrms lead by a female CEO (H5) should be reﬂected in
the positive coefﬁcient on FemaleCEO ∗ CorruptionMean (μ1), while the positive effect of heterogeneity in corruption on ﬁrm efﬁ-
ciency for ﬁrms lead by a female CEO (H6) will be evidenced by a negative coefﬁcient on FemaleCEO ∗ CorruptionStDev (μ2).
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Our ﬁnal sample contains 76,552 observations and covers 14 Central and Eastern European countries from 2000 to 2013. The
descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1. The average ﬁrm in the sample has USD 7.4 million of total assets, a
proﬁtability ratio of 0.076, a leverage ratio slightly lower than its industry mean (−0.0004), and a cash position of 0.10. The av-
erage efﬁciency is about 0.70, which is far from the “best practice” efﬁciency frontier; efﬁciency decreases as it moves away from
0 toward the maximum of 0.986 within this sample. Manufacturing ﬁrms and ﬁrms operating in the transportation sector have
the highest representation among the top 5% and top 1% of efﬁcient ﬁrms in the sample. The top 5% of efﬁcient ﬁrms is mostlyTable 2
Firm efﬁciency and business constraints.
Independent variables Dependent variable = ﬁrm efﬁciency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Corrupt environment
Corruption mean 0.031a 0.065a 0.031a 0.030a 0.036a 0.032a 0.033a 0.063a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Corruption std. deviation −0.013c −0.018a −0.013c −0.013c −0.011 −0.012c −0.012c −0.014b
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial variables
Size [ln (assets)] 0.019a 0.020a 0.019a 0.019a 0.020a 0.019a 0.019a 0.020a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size squared 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proﬁtability 0.030a 0.029a 0.030a 0.030a 0.030a 0.030a 0.030a 0.029a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Missing leverage 0.059a 0.053a 0.059a 0.058a 0.058a 0.058a 0.059a 0.057a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry adjusted leverage −0.048a −0.050a −0.048a −0.049a −0.049a −0.049a −0.049a −0.050a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash 0.131a 0.131a 0.131a 0.131a 0.131a 0.131a 0.131a 0.131a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Problematic factors for operation and growth+
Access to ﬁnancing 0.010b −0.000
(0.005) (0.004)
Tax rates 0.033a 0.012a
(0.004) (0.004)
Custom and trade regulations −0.013a −0.021a
(0.005) (0.004)
Business licensing and permits 0.008c −0.008b
(0.005) (0.004)
Labor regulations 0.020a −0.012a
(0.005) (0.004)
Functioning of the judiciary −0.097a −0.079a
(0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.749a 0.773a 0.750a 0.743a 0.757a 0.756a 0.748a 0.788a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R squared 0.310 0.315 0.310 0.310 0.311 0.310 0.310 0.314
N (number of observations) 76,542 76,479 76,542 76,542 76,479 76,542 76,542 76,542
Symbols a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
+ Taken from the BEEPS survey, from the set of questions on the business environment (1 = no obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle, 3 = moderate obstacle, 4 = major
obstacle). Transformation applied: (factor-1)/3.
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among 5% of the most efﬁcient ﬁrms in the sample is 17.1%, increasing to 18.3% in the top 1%, though the share of foreign-con-
trolled ﬁrms for the overall sample is only 15.4%.
The mean level of corruption is about 0.23 and deviates from 0 to 0.8. As for the business environment characteristics, custom
and trade regulations are reported to be the lowest obstacle for operations and growth (0.206), while tax rates are the highest
obstacle (0.604) for doing business. About 23% of the companies in the sample have a domestic majority owner. Minority non-
controlling ownership represents b1% of this sample. Finally, 4.2% of the ﬁrms in the sample are managed by female CEOs. No
CEO information is available for 62% of the (smaller) companies.
5. Results
5.1. Main effects: mean and variance
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the relationship between corruption and ﬁrm efﬁciency. We ﬁrst test whether cor-
ruption has an adverse effect on ﬁrm efﬁciency. The coefﬁcient of interest is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant in all re-
gressions (Models 1–8). A positive coefﬁcient indicates an increased distance from the efﬁcient production frontier. Thus, higher
corruption is associated with lower ﬁrm efﬁciency. The estimated coefﬁcient ranges from 0.031 (with standard error 0.006) for
Model (1) to 0.065 (with standard error 0.006) for Model (2).17 Put differently, a 1% increase in the average level of corruption
is associated with a 2% decrease in average ﬁrm efﬁciency. These results support Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with the idea
of corruption being an additional cost that distorts the optimal allocation of resources.
Next, in line with Hypothesis 2, we ﬁnd that heterogeneity in corruption perception is positively related to efﬁciency. The neg-
ative coefﬁcient on the corruption standard deviation variable signals that a larger variance in perceptions of corruption in the
environment is conducive to efﬁciency for the average ﬁrm.18 The estimated coefﬁcients vary from−0.011 to −0.018 (with stan-
dard error 0.007) depending on the model. More speciﬁcally, a 1% increase in corruption perception variation is associated with
an increase in ﬁrm efﬁciency by 0.61%. We could speculate that companies with a lower propensity to bribe are the ones improv-
ing their efﬁciency. The pressure put on increasing efﬁciency has its limits. When these limits are crossed, companies exit the en-
vironment. This happened, for example, to Shell Brazil when they sold their Agip service stations in 2000.19
All regressions (Models 1–8) in Table 2 are estimated on the sample of 76,542 ﬁrms and have R-squared values of about 31%.
The estimated coefﬁcients for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables have expected signs with respect to efﬁciency and are highly sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (b0.01 p-values). We discuss the coefﬁcients of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables reported in Column 1 of Table 2, but
the estimated coefﬁcients and their interpretations are consistent across all speciﬁcations. The estimated coefﬁcient for ﬁrm
size is 0.019 (with standard error 0.000), which indicates that larger ﬁrms are less efﬁcient. We also control for potential non-lin-
earity between ﬁrm size and efﬁciency by including a squared ﬁrm size variable, but the relationship remains positive. Firm prof-
itability is negatively related to ﬁrm efﬁciency in our sample (estimated coefﬁcient 0.03 with standard error 0.003). This is not
particularly surprising as less proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to watch every dollar more closely. For example, during recessions, companies
tend to decrease discretionary spending, which forces the company into a “leaner” shape. Further, higher leverage is associated
with greater efﬁciency: the coefﬁcient is negative (−0.048) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Speciﬁcally, our adjusted
leverage variable measures the difference between the company's leverage and the mean leverage ratio of the industry in the par-
ticular year. The larger the difference between ﬁrm leverage and the industry mean leverage, the higher the efﬁciency, provided
ﬁrm leverage is higher than the industry mean. This is consistent with Jensen (1986), who argues that leverage serves as a
disciplining tool and forces managers to improve efﬁciency. Lastly, consistent with the literature on the value of cash holdings
and managerial discipline (e.g., Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007), ﬁrms with higher cash holdings
are less efﬁcient.
Models 2–8 in Table 2 also control for characteristics of the business environment that might shape the efﬁciency of ﬁrms. The
results in Column 2 of Table 2 show that limited access to ﬁnancing, high tax rates, difﬁculties with business licensing and per-
mits, and inﬂexible labor regulation are associated with lower ﬁrm efﬁciency. Interestingly, customs and trade regulations and the
functioning of the judicial system have the opposite effects. Columns 3–8 report regression results separately for each of the busi-
ness environment characteristics.
5.2. Mediating effects: foreign ownership and female CEO
For foreign ﬁrms and ﬁrms led by a female CEO, the effect of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency would likely be ampliﬁed. First, we
examine direct effects by including foreign ownership and female CEO indicators in our models.
Table 3 presents estimation results. All regressions include ﬁrm-speciﬁc controls and business environment characteristics. The
estimated coefﬁcients for these characteristics are consistent with the results reported in Table 2.20 Column 1 reports the effect of17 Note thatModel (1) contains only corruption variables and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, while Model (2) also includes the full set of business environment charac-
teristics potentially problematic for operation and growth.
18 It certainly might be the case that the cluster is so polarized that the “average” ﬁrm in that cluster does not exist.
19 See the case of Shell Brazil selling its service stations to Agip do Brazil (Financial Times of London, February 25, 2000, page 18).
20 Detailed results are available upon request.
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Table 3
Firm efﬁciency, ownership, and CEO gender.
Independent variables Dependent variable = ﬁrm efﬁciency
(1) (2) (3)
Corrupt environment
Corruption mean 0.068a 0.031a 0.034a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Corruption std. deviation −0.020a −0.013c −0.015b
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ownership control+
Foreign 0.014a 0.013a
(0.002) (0.002)
Domestic 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Minority - no control 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Managerial data
Female CEO −0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Missing CEO −0.003 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Control variables++
Firm ﬁnancials YES YES YES
Obstacles to growth YES YES YES
Constant 0.749a 0.751a 0.750a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R squared 0.310 0.310 0.311
N (number of observations) 76,542 76,542 76,542
Symbols a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
+ An excluded category is dispersed and unknown ownership.
++ The list of control variables is identical to Table 2. The coefﬁcients are very similar and have an unchanged sign and/or signiﬁcance. We do not list them here to
save space; detailed results are available upon request.
11J. Hanousek et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxxcompany ownership on ﬁrm efﬁciency. Note that majority foreign ownership is associated with lower efﬁciency compared to dis-
persed ownership; majority domestic ownership and non-controlling minority ownership are not disadvantaged in terms of efﬁ-
ciency. According to the results reported in Column 2, ﬁrms managed by female CEOs are as efﬁcient as male-managed ﬁrms,
which is consistent with our prior beliefs. Finally, in Model 3, we control simultaneously for both ownership structure and female
CEO. However, the sign and magnitude of the coefﬁcients of interest stay unchanged.21
We further analyze the interaction effects between ﬁrms with a lower probability of bribing (foreign ownership, and female
CEO) and the characteristics of the corrupt environment. The estimation results are reported in Table 4. All regressions include
both ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and those of the business environment, which are not reported because of space consider-
ations.22 Models 1 and 3 account for the interactions between majority foreign ownership and characteristics of the corrupt en-
vironment. Consistent with our previous ﬁndings, foreign majority ownership is associated with lower efﬁciency (the estimated
coefﬁcient is 0.01 with standard error 0.003). Moreover, foreign-controlled ﬁrms are at an even higher disadvantage in a high-cor-
ruption environment. The coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term is 0.06 (standard error 0.017), meaning that a 1% increase
in the average level of corruption is related to a 3.16% decrease in efﬁciency of foreign ﬁrms. At the same time, greater variance in
perceptions of corruption is associated with higher efﬁciency for foreign-controlled ﬁrms. When corruption is not widespread
(there are corruption-free or low-corruption sub-environments), foreign companies that focus on utilizing their resources improve
their efﬁciency, as is supported by a negative statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the interaction term. We estimate that a 1%
increase in variation of corruption perceptions is associated with a 1.53% increase in the efﬁciency of foreign ﬁrms. These results
support Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Model 2 focuses on the interaction of female CEOs with the corrupt environment.23 We ﬁnd that female CEOs behave differ-
ently in corrupt environments than their male counterparts. This is consistent with the theoretical literature showing different
gender preferences toward illegal activities. A higher corruption level is found to have a greater negative effect on the efﬁciency
of ﬁrms managed by female CEOs compared to those managed by male CEOs. Speciﬁcally, a 1% increase in the average level of
corruption is associated with a decrease in efﬁciency of ﬁrms managed by female CEOs by 2.80%. Further, a greater variance in
the perceptions of corruption is not translated into higher efﬁciency for ﬁrms led by female CEOs. Even though the sign on the21 There is a notable coefﬁcient change on corruption variables (e.g., the estimated coefﬁcient on corruption mean drops from 0.068 inmodel 1 to 0.031 and 0.034 in
model 2 and 3 respectively); however, this trend is reversed in subsequent models.
22 The results are available upon request.
23 We also analyze the descriptive statistics between the controlling shareholder and CEO gender. Overall, female CEOs lead the ﬁrm in 4.2% of cases. The main dis-
tribution of female CEOs among the controlled ﬁrms is as follows: about 5.5% of female CEOs work in foreign controlled ﬁrms, 4.5% work in a state controlled ﬁrm,
and 6.2% in foreign family ﬁrms, while in local family owned ﬁrms the percentage reaches 12.1%. Note thatmost female CEOswork inﬁrmswith a combined, dispersed,
or unknown ownership structure.
Please cite this article as: Hanousek, J., et al., Firm efﬁciency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments, J. Corp.
Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpﬁn.2017.06.008
Table 4
Firm efﬁciency, ownership, and CEO gender interacting with a corrupt environment.
Independent variables Dependent variable = ﬁrm efﬁciency
(1) (2) (3)
Corrupt environment
Corruption mean 0.028a 0.029a 0.061a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Corruption std. deviation −0.013c −0.012c −0.019b
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Ownership control+
Foreign 0.010a 0.009a
(0.003) (0.003)
Domestic 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Minority - no control 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Foreign ownership control interacting with bribery
Corruption mean 0.068a 0.061a
(0.017) (0.017)
Corruption std. deviation −0.048b −0.034c
(0.020) (0.020)
Managerial data
Female CEO −0.010 −0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Missing CEO −0.003 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
CEO gender interacting with
Corruption mean 0.071a 0.052b
(0.023) (0.023)
Corruption std. deviation −0.029 −0.006
(0.032) (0.032)
Control variables++
Firm ﬁnancials YES YES YES
Obstacles to growth YES YES YES
Constant 0.751a 0.752a 0.777a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R squared 0.311 0.310 0.316
N (number of observations) 76,542 76,542 76,479
Symbols a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
+ An excluded category is dispersed and unknown ownership.
++ The list of control variables is identical to Table 2. The coefﬁcients are very similar and have an unchanged sign and/or signiﬁcance. We do not list them here to
save space; detailed results are available upon request.
12 J. Hanousek et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxxinteraction term between female CEO and the variance in perception of corruption is in line with our expectations, the estimated
effect is not signiﬁcant. Stated in terms of our alternative hypotheses, we reject the null hypothesis of H5 and fail to reject the null
hypothesis of H6. These results complement Mironov (2015), who argues that one should hire a corrupt CEO in a corrupt country.
Our results suggest that one could potentially beneﬁt from hiring a male CEO in high-corruption environments.
Model 3 in Table 4 is the complete model of this study. It contains both foreign ownership and female CEO controls, interacted
with the corruption environment characteristics. All previously reported results hold; a corrupt environment is particularly detri-
mental for those ﬁrms with a lower propensity to bribe.24
We further test whether the adverse impact of corruption on ﬁrm efﬁciency is more pronounced for foreign owners whose
headquarters are based in countries with low corruption. We split the sample of foreign ﬁrms into ﬁrms from low corruption
countries and the remaining foreign ﬁrms.25 Then these subcategories are interacted with corruption characteristics of the envi-
ronment. Estimation results are reported in Table 5. All regressions include both ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and characteristics of
the business environment. Models in columns 3 and 4 also include managerial data (female CEO) and the interactions of a female
CEO with the corruption environment characteristics. In line with our expectations, foreign ﬁrms from low-corruption countries
experience a much stronger effect of the corrupt environment on their efﬁciency. These results are robust across speciﬁcations.
For example, in column 4, the estimated coefﬁcient of the corruption mean on the efﬁciency of ﬁrms from low-corruption coun-
tries is 0.163 (standard error 0.074) compared to only 0.068 (standard error 0.017) for the remaining foreign ﬁrms. Put24 We also test for foreign ownership and CEO gender complementarity with respect to efﬁciency by including their interaction term in the regression. Based on the
regression results, foreign ownership and CEO gender do not complement each other in affecting the distribution of efﬁciency – the estimated coefﬁcient of interest is
negative and not signiﬁcant. The results are available upon request.
25 Low-corruption countries are the Top 25 countries (very clean) in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International. Shareholders'
low-corruption home countries that are present in our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
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Table 5
Firm efﬁciency, ownership, and CEO gender interacting with a corrupt environment.
Independent variables Dependent variable = ﬁrm efﬁciency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corrupt environment
Corruption mean 0.068a 0.062a 0.066a 0.060a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Corruption std. deviation −0.021a −0.020a −0.021a −0.020a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Ownership control+
Foreign- low corruption countries 0.050a 0.052a 0.049a 0.052a
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
Foreign- rest 0.011a 0.004 0.011a 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Domestic 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Minority - no control 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Foreign ownership control interacting with corruption
Corruption mean - low corruption countries 0.166b 0.163b
(0.074) (0.074)
Corruption mean - rest 0.072a 0.068a
(0.017) (0.017)
Corruption std. deviation - low corruption countries −0.145c −0.143c
(0.078) (0.078)
Corruption std. deviation -rest −0.036c −0.033
(0.020) (0.020)
Control variables++
Managerial data & interactions NO NO YES YES
Firm ﬁnancials YES YES YES YES
Obstacles to growth YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.774a 0.776a 0.777a 0.778a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R squared 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.316
N (number of observations) 76,479 76,479 76,479 76,479
Symbols a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
+ An excluded category is dispersed and unknown ownership.
++ The list of control variables is identical to Table 2. The coefﬁcients are very similar and have an unchanged sign and/or signiﬁcance. We do not list them here to
save space; detailed results are available upon request.
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ﬁrms that come from low-corruption countries. Also, foreign ﬁrms from low-corruption countries better utilize the presence of a
corruption-free (or low-corruption) sub-environment. Greater variance in perceptions of corruption is associated with more efﬁ-
ciency for foreign-controlled ﬁrms. This effect is much stronger for foreign ﬁrms from low-corruption countries (estimated coef-
ﬁcient is −0.143 with a standard error of 0.078) and represents the average boost in efﬁciency of 4.29% when the variation of
corruption perceptions increases by 1%.
To sum up, this paper shows robust correlations between corruption and ﬁrm efﬁciency motivated by theoretical consider-
ations. To strengthen a causal interpretation of the results, we include a large number of control variables and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
in all our speciﬁcations; however, we acknowledge that time-variant factors may also be affecting the key relationships of interest.
Certainly, more research, perhaps relying on a natural experimental setting, would be desirable.
5.3. Robustness tests
In this section, we examine the robustness of our main ﬁndings to alternative subsamples and controls.
5.3.1. Difference in corruption levels
The alternative way of testing whether owners from countries with low corruption have a greater disadvantage in terms of
efﬁciency when operating in the corrupt environment is to control for the difference in the levels of corruption between two
countries. Results reported in Table 6 are consistent with our main results – the greater distance in corruption levels between
home and host countries is associated with greater inefﬁciency. For example, the difference in the levels of corruption between
two countries of 10 points (the host country is more corrupt than the home country) is associated with a decrease in efﬁciency
of 1.43%.
5.3.2. Experience
It could be argued that male CEOs are simply more experienced in corrupting bureaucrats. While we do not have the detailed
data on education and functional background of CEOs in our sample, the information on tenure is available. The average tenure ofPlease cite this article as: Hanousek, J., et al., Firm efﬁciency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments, J. Corp.
Finance (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpﬁn.2017.06.008
Table 6
Robustness check: tenure and difference in corruption levels.
Independent variables Dependent variable = ﬁrm efﬁciency
(1) (2)
Foreign ownership control interacting with bribery+
Corruption mean 0.060a 0.064a
(0.017) (0.017)
Corruption std. deviation −0.033 −0.045b
(0.020) (0.020)
Difference in corruption level 0.001a
(0.000)
Managerial data
Female CEO −0.012 −0.010
(0.007) (0.007)
CEO tenure 0.001b
(0.001)
Missing CEO tenure 0.001
(0.003)
Missing CEO −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
CEO gender interacting with
Corruption mean 0.052b 0.062a
(0.023) (0.023)
Corruption std. deviation −0.005 −0.018
(0.032) (0.032)
Control variables++
Firm ﬁnancials YES YES
Obstacles to growth YES YES
Constant 0.762a 0.857a
Obstacles to growth (0.016) (0.015)
R squared 0.316 0.311
N (number of observations) 76,479 76,510
Symbols a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
+ An excluded category is dispersed and unknown ownership.
++ The list of control variables is identical to Table 2. The coefﬁcients are very similar and have an unchanged sign and/or signiﬁcance. We do not list them here to
save space; detailed results are available upon request.
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in experience by controlling for the experience of CEOs in our regression analysis. We also control for cases when CEO tenure in-
formation is missing by including a Missing Tenure dummy, while missing CEO tenure is replaced with a constant, the mean of
the observed values.
Table 6 presents the estimation results. Longer tenure of a CEO has an adverse effect on ﬁrm efﬁciency. The coefﬁcient esti-
mate for CEO tenure is signiﬁcant at the 5% level but very small in magnitude.26 However, the sign and magnitude of the coefﬁ-
cients of interest are similar to the main regression results.
5.3.3. Industrial variation
In some sectors corruption could be more important than in others (e.g., resource-intensive industries), so even ﬁrms with a
lower probability of bribing (lead by a female CEO) may be more inclined to engage in illegal activities. To test this conjecture, we
aggregate industries into groups based on their intensity. We differentiate between resource-, capital- and labor-intensive indus-
tries using Eurostat classiﬁcation (Laaﬁa, 2002).27 While ﬁrms operating in capital- and labor-intensive sectors are more efﬁcient,
female CEOs do not appear to behave more corruptly if they operate in resource-, capital- or labor-intensive sectors. Other coef-
ﬁcients of interest are of the same size and magnitude as in our main regressions. These results are reported in Table 7.
5.3.4. Cost efﬁciency
We also analyze ﬁrm cost (in)efﬁciency as the dependent variable in our study. Unfortunately, due to data limitation, we can-
not run a broadly deﬁned and detailed cost function because we do not have any additional information on the price of the var-
ious forms of labor, capital and/or infrastructure. Therefore, we use a simple version of the cost function, where the dependent
variables represent the cost of production (as collected in the EU accounting system) and the independent variables are once
more the capital and labor involved. The overall results are in line with expectations. Higher heterogeneity in corruption percep-
tion is associated with higher cost efﬁciency. Foreign ﬁrms and ﬁrms run by female CEOs are more efﬁcient in cost cutting when
the corruption level is high. While these results are in line with our main results, they should be interpreted with caution because26 This is consistent with the existing evidence that more experienced (and older) managers tend to adoptmore conservative strategies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003)
and have lower receptiveness to new ideas (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) that could result in lower ﬁrm efﬁciency.
27 Resource intensive: NACE 5, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27; Capital (technology) intensive: NACE 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34; Labor intensive: NACE 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 35.
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Table 7
Robustness check: accounting for industry intensity.
Independent variables Dependent var. = ﬁrm efﬁciency
(1) (2) (3)
Corruption mean × resource-intensive industries+ −0.039 (0.098)
Corruption std. deviation × resource-intensive industries −0.010 (0.008)
Corruption mean × capital-intensive industries 0.090 (0.146)
Corruption std. deviation × capital-intensive industries −0.106 (0.156)
Corruption mean × labor-intensive industries 0.040 (0.066)
Corruption std. deviation × labor-intensive industries −0.038 (0.079)
Dummy for resource-intensive industries −0.010 (0.008)
Dummy for capital-intensive industries −0.054a (0.007)
Dummy for labor-intensive industries −0.052a (0.005)
Control variables++
Firm ﬁnancials YES YES YES
Obstacles to growth YES YES YES
Constant 0.788a (0.016) 0.778a (0.014) 0.778a (0.014)
R-squared 0.3158 0.3162 0.3167
N (number of observations) 76,479 76,479 76,479
+ We differentiate between resource-, capital- and labor-intensive industries using Eurostat classiﬁcation (Laaﬁa, 2002); Resource intensive: NACE 5, 13, 14, 20, 21,
23, 26, 27; Capital (technology) intensive: NACE 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34; Labor intensive: NACE 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 35.
++ The list of control variables is identical to Table 2. We do not list them here to save space; detailed results are available upon request. Symbols a, b, and c denote
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
15J. Hanousek et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthe second stage regression indicates a poor ﬁt (R2 = 0.006), suggesting that we need better information on the cost structure
and its determinants, which we do not have. Further, the ﬁnal cost (in)efﬁciency dataset is much smaller. We lose about 35%
of observations, a signiﬁcant number of countries and/or some time periods when we compare that dataset to the main one.
Therefore, we do not report the results in the paper but they are available upon request.
6. Conclusion
This study offers a systematic analysis of how environmental characteristics – speciﬁcally those related to corruption – affect
ﬁrm efﬁciency. Economic theory suggests that corruption should be highly detrimental to efﬁciency since bribes distort the com-
petitive forces incentivizing the adoption of more efﬁcient production and managerial practices. We suggest that the average level
of corruption in an environment may, in general, be insufﬁcient to fully characterize the effects of corruption on efﬁciency. While
an environment may be highly corrupt on average, pockets of economic activity may still exist that are relatively corruption-free.
In those sub-environments, the competitive forces leading to efﬁciency may work to full effect. The dispersion in the level of cor-
ruption across sectors or regions may also matter.
The paper has a number of implications for how different ﬁrms are affected by characteristics of the corrupt environment. Our
results indicate that foreign-owned ﬁrms are adversely affected by high levels of average corruption. This can be viewed as a spe-
ciﬁc type of liability of foreignness. Because foreign owners do not know who to bribe or chose to comply with certain cultural or
legal norms, they might be at a disadvantage, relative to local owners. Interestingly, however, we also ﬁnd that foreign-owned
ﬁrms can mitigate this liability by locating in sub-environments where corruption is less prevalent.
We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms run by a female CEO, who for a number of reasons might be less disposed toward engaging in corrup-
tion (e.g., Levin et al., 1988; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Bertrand, 2011), are disadvantaged by a high level of average corruption.
However, unlike foreign owners, heterogeneity in the perceptions of corruption does not mitigate this adverse effect. We hypoth-
esize that there may be differences in the extent to which foreign-owned ﬁrms and ﬁrms run by a female CEO can select their
operating environment. Firms run by a female CEO may be established ﬁrms that at some point in their life-cycle have been hand-
ed over to a female heir. Thus, the female CEO might have less scope concerning the sub-environment where the ﬁrm should be
located than foreign owners about to enter a new market, c. If this hypothesis is correct, then the paper points to the importance
of both owners and managers being aware of the characteristics of the local operating environment. Those that want to conduct
business honestly have the opportunity to escape the adverse effect of a highly corrupt environment (on average), by locating
their businesses in sub-environments that are less affected by corruption.
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